Publications

@article{javierblanco003,

title = {Evaluating integration methods of a quantum random number generator in OpenSSL for TLS},

author = {Javier Blanco-Romero and Vicente Lorenzo and Florina Almenares and Daniel Díaz-Sánchez and Carlos García-Rubio and Celeste Campo and Andrés Marín},

url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389128624007096?via%3Dihub},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2024.110877},

isbn = {1389-1286},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-10-25},

urldate = {2024-10-25},

volume = {255},

publisher = {Computer Networks},

abstract = {The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a significant threat to conventional cryptography. Whilst post-quantum cryptography (PQC) stands as the prevailing trend for fortifying the security of cryptographic systems, the coexistence of quantum and classical computing paradigms presents an opportunity to leverage the strengths of both technologies, for instance, nowadays the use of Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs) – considered as True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) – opens up the possibility of discussing hybrid systems. In this paper, we evaluate both aspects, on the one hand, we use hybrid TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocol that leverages the widely used secure protocol on the Internet and integrates PQC algorithms, and, on the other hand, we evaluate two approaches to integrate a QRNG, i.e., Quantis PCIe-240M, in OpenSSL 3.0 to be used by TLS. Both approaches are compared through a Nginx Web server, that uses OpenSSL’s implementation of TLS 1.3 for secure web communication. Our findings highlight the importance of optimizing such integration method, because while direct integration can lead to performance penalties specific to the method and hardware used, alternative methods demonstrate the potential for efficient QRNG deployment in cryptographic systems.},

keywords = {compromise, I-Shaper, Linux, OpenSSL, QRNGs, Quantum random number generators, Qursa, TLS},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{8704893,

title = {TLS/PKI Challenges and Certificate Pinning Techniques for IoT and M2M Secure Communications},

author = {Daniel Díaz-Sánchez and Andrés Marín-López and Florina Almenárez-Mendoza and Patricia Arias-Cabarcos and R. Simon-Sherratt},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1109/COMST.2019.2914453

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8704893

https://phpmyadmin.pervasive.it.uc3m.es/download/TLC-PKI-challenges-certificate-pinning.pdf},

doi = {10.1109/COMST.2019.2914453},

issn = {1553-877X},

year  = {2019},

date = {2019-05-02},

urldate = {2019-05-02},

journal = {IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials},

volume = {21},

issue = {4},

pages = {3502-3531},

abstract = {Transport layer security (TLS) is becoming the de facto standard to provide end-to-end security in the current Internet. IoT and M2M scenarios are not an exception since TLS is also being adopted there. The ability of TLS for negotiating any security parameter, its flexibility and extensibility are responsible for its wide adoption but also for several attacks. Moreover, as it relies on public key infrastructure (PKI) for authentication, it is also affected by PKI problems. Considering the advent of IoT/M2M scenarios and their particularities, it is necessary to have a closer look at TLS history to evaluate the potential challenges of using TLS and PKI in these scenarios. According to this, this paper provides a deep revision of several security aspects of TLS and PKI, with a particular focus on current certificate pinning solutions in order to illustrate the potential problems that should be addressed.},

keywords = {authentication, certificate pinning, cynamon, DTLS, Internet of Things, Machine to Machine, magos, PKI, Protocols, TLS, Trusted Third Party, Tutorials},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}