Publications

@article{javierblanco006,

title = {Implementing and Evaluating Post-Quantum DNSSEC in CoreDNS},

author = {Julio Gento Suela and Javier Blanco-Romero and Florina Almenares-Mendoza and Daniel Díaz Sánchez },

doi = { https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2507.09301},

year  = {2025},

date = {2025-07-15},

urldate = {2025-07-15},

abstract = {The emergence of quantum computers poses a significant threat to current secure service, application and/or protocol implementations that rely on RSA and ECDSA algorithms, for instance DNSSEC, because public-key cryptography based on number factorization or discrete logarithm is vulnerable to quantum attacks. This paper presents the integration of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms into CoreDNS to enable quantum-resistant DNSSEC functionality. We have developed a plugin that extends CoreDNS with support for five PQC signature algorithm families: ML-DSA, FALCON, SPHINCS+, MAYO, and SNOVA. Our implementation maintains compatibility with existing DNS resolution flows while providing on-the-fly signing using quantum-resistant signatures. A benchmark has been performed and performance evaluation results reveal significant trade-offs between security and efficiency. The results indicate that while PQC algorithms introduce operational overhead, several candidates offer viable compromises for transitioning DNSSEC to quantum-resistant cryptography.},

keywords = {CoreDNS, Discovery, DNS security, DNSSEC, I-Shaper, Post-Quantum Cryptography, Qursa, Ramones},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{javierblanco007,

title = {Hybrid Quantum Security for IPsec},

author = {Javier Blanco-Romero and Pedro Otero García and Daniel Sobral-Blanco and Florina Almenares-Mendoza and Ana Fernández Vilas and Manuel Fernández-Veiga},

url = {https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.09288},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2507.09288},

year  = {2025},

date = {2025-07-12},

pages = {23},

abstract = {Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security against quantum computing threats, but integrating QKD into existing security protocols remains an unsolved challenge due to fundamental mismatches between pre-distributed quantum keys and computational key exchange paradigms. This paper presents the first systematic comparison of sequential versus parallel hybrid QKD-PQC key establishment strategies for IPsec, revealing fundamental protocol design principles that extend beyond specific implementations. We introduce two novel approaches for incorporating QKD into Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) with support for both ETSI GS QKD 004 stateful and ETSI GS QKD 014 stateless API specifications: (1) a pure QKD approach that replaces computational key derivation with identifier-based quantum key coordination, and (2) a unified QKD-KEM abstraction that enables parallel composition of quantum and post-quantum cryptographic methods within existing protocol frameworks. Our key insight is that parallel hybrid approaches eliminate the multiplicative latency penalties inherent in sequential methods mandated by RFC 9370, achieving significant performance improvements under realistic network conditions. Performance evaluation using a Docker-based testing framework with IDQuantique QKD hardware demonstrates that the parallel hybrid approach significantly outperforms sequential methods under network latency conditions, while pure QKD achieves minimal bandwidth overhead through identifier-based key coordination. Our implementations provide practical quantum-enhanced IPsec solutions suitable for critical infrastructure deployments requiring defense-in-depth security.},

keywords = {Discovery, I-Shaper, Internet Protocol Security, Key Distritution, Post-Quantum Cryptography, Quantum Key Distribution, Qursa, Ramones},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{javierblanco007b,

title = {Hybrid Quantum Security for IPsec},

author = {Javier Blanco-Romero and Pedro Otero García and Daniel Sobral-Blanco and Florina Almenares-Mendoza and Ana Fernández Vilas and Manuel Fernández-Veiga},

url = {https://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.09288},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2507.09288},

year  = {2025},

date = {2025-07-12},

urldate = {2025-07-12},

pages = {23},

abstract = {Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security against quantum computing threats, but integrating QKD into existing security protocols remains an unsolved challenge due to fundamental mismatches between pre-distributed quantum keys and computational key exchange paradigms. This paper presents the first systematic comparison of sequential versus parallel hybrid QKD-PQC key establishment strategies for IPsec, revealing fundamental protocol design principles that extend beyond specific implementations. We introduce two novel approaches for incorporating QKD into Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) with support for both ETSI GS QKD 004 stateful and ETSI GS QKD 014 stateless API specifications: (1) a pure QKD approach that replaces computational key derivation with identifier-based quantum key coordination, and (2) a unified QKD-KEM abstraction that enables parallel composition of quantum and post-quantum cryptographic methods within existing protocol frameworks. Our key insight is that parallel hybrid approaches eliminate the multiplicative latency penalties inherent in sequential methods mandated by RFC 9370, achieving significant performance improvements under realistic network conditions. Performance evaluation using a Docker-based testing framework with IDQuantique QKD hardware demonstrates that the parallel hybrid approach significantly outperforms sequential methods under network latency conditions, while pure QKD achieves minimal bandwidth overhead through identifier-based key coordination. Our implementations provide practical quantum-enhanced IPsec solutions suitable for critical infrastructure deployments requiring defense-in-depth security.},

keywords = {Discovery, I-Shaper, Internet Protocol Security, Key Distritution, Post-Quantum Cryptography, Quantum Key Distribution, Qursa, Ramones},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}